麻豆原创

Introduction and Overview

Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, Georgia was once considered the 鈥溾�� in the South听Caucasus,听听And tied to that, Georgia鈥檚 primary foreign policy goal has historically centered on integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, specifically through EU and NATO membership.听After rising to power in 2012, Georgia鈥檚 ruling party (the Georgian Dream) pledged to pursue a 鈥減ragmatic鈥� relationship with Russia while continually working towards Western integration. Yet,听despite these promises, Georgia has experienced significant democratic backsliding while pivoting towards Russia, and thereby hindering its chances of further Euro-Atlantic integration. This sharp departure in policy is widely attributed to Georgian Dream鈥檚 founder and informal leader, Bidzini Ivanishvili, who holds considerable business interests and听. Nevertheless, the听question of where Georgia鈥檚 true loyalties lie remains unanswered.听

Georgia鈥檚 rapprochement with Russia is distressing because it has coincided with a time when Georgia鈥檚 EU ambitions have hit a snag. This assumes, however, that Georgia鈥檚 foreign policy must be either pro-Western or pro-Russian. This creates a false dichotomy and fails to explain Georgia鈥檚 seemingly contradictory actions. If we look past Ivanishvili鈥檚 personal motivations and influence, Georgian leaders鈥� ideology and foreign policy remain rather ambiguous, as the government pursues somewhat incompatible objectives of European integration and normalized relations with Russia. Georgia continues to convey interest in joining Euro-Atlantic alliances,听,听, and contributing to NATO missions overseas, as well as听. However, the Georgian Dream has also strengthened ties with Western adversaries,听,听,听, and听. To assess Georgia鈥檚 positionality, it is essential to explore the potential reasoning and underlying logic of Georgian leaders鈥� statements and political decisions in context. Georgia鈥檚 path to EU candidacy has been marked by three critical junctures which听help us to explain the inconsistencies of Georgia鈥檚 foreign policy: the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the rise of the Georgian Dream party in 2012, and the 2022 invasion of听Ukraine. While the return of great power politics has led many states鈥� economic and security policies to become further intertwined, this piece contends that the Georgian Dream鈥檚 pursuit of economic integration with competing great powers reflects a realist strategy in which Georgian leaders seek to maximize their geostrategic location and minimize vulnerabilities in state security.听

2008 Russo-Georgian War

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia was nearly a failed state, plagued by economic weakness and corruption. In response to rigged parliamentary elections in November 2003, opposition leaders holding red roses stormed the Georgian Parliament, leading to the resignation of Soviet-era leader Eduard Shevardnadze. The Rose Revolution was viewed favorably in the West as the first nonviolent transfer of power in the Caucasus and demonstrated Georgians鈥� commitment to democracy. This marked the beginning of a strained relationship between Georgia and Russia.

After several years of deteriorating relations between Georgia and Russia, tensions reached a breaking point following the听April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where听. In August 2008, Russia invaded the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, which remain occupied to this day. This marked the first occurrence of full-scale Russian aggression against a sovereign nation since the fall of the Soviet Union,听signaling that Moscow was willing and able to defend its old backyard. In the months that followed, Western leaders offered little support to Georgia, as the听听and the new US administration sought to 鈥榬eset鈥� relations with Russia. As outlined in the following sections, the historical memory of the 2008 war is routinely听听to听.

Democratic Backsliding Under the Georgian Dream

Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia had been ruled by pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili; however,听听as well as his perceived role in the 2008 war severely diminished public approval of Saakashvili鈥檚 United National Movement (UNM) party.听As Saakashvili neared the end of his second term, billionaire Bidzini Ivanishvili created the Georgian Dream party and formed a coalition of political parties to run against Saakashvili and the UNM. By uniting opposition groups, the Georgian Dream coalition was able to mobilize public support and win the successive 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections. Once in power, however, the Georgian Dream听听through patronage politics, electoral fraud, and targeted prosecution of opposition leaders and journalists.

The Georgian Dream has always included European integration as a part of their party platform, as 80% of Georgians support this goal. Facing a fragmented political opposition, Georgian Dream leaders only need to appear to be working towards these goals. As such, progress towards membership has tended to be symbolic. For example,听, inscribing the government鈥檚 commitment 鈥渢o ensure Georgia鈥檚 full integration into the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.鈥� Simultaneously, amendments were included to abolish direct presidential elections, strip presidential authority, and concentrate power in the hands of the Prime Minister and Parliament.听

The Georgian Dream鈥檚 actions reflect a strategic manipulation of the European integration process to stay in power. To deflect blame and distract from the stalled reform process, leaders of the ruling party accuse opposition leaders of sabotaging the country鈥檚 EU prospects. The government鈥檚 failed impeachment of President Salome Zourabichvili this fall illustrates these tactics. Since breaking with the party, Zourabichvili has expressed sharp听criticism of the Georgian Dream and stated that Georgia did not deserve EU candidate status in 2022. During her visits with EU leaders at the end of the summer, the Georgian Dream initiated impeachment proceedings against Zourabichvili,听听by eroding confidence among EU leaders and exacerbating domestic polarization. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and other members of the ruling party have asserted that granting Georgia candidate status would听. Following a series of meetings with EU leaders in early October, the Prime Minister expressed confidence in EU support for Georgia鈥檚 candidacy after receiving commitments from numerous member states.

War in Ukraine

The Georgian Dream鈥檚 policies since Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have increased tension between the Georgian government and Western leaders.听Georgia鈥檚 reluctance to join EU sanctions against Russia has听听who believe prospective EU countries should seek alignment with EU foreign policy. Georgian Prime Minister has pushed back听Like many other developing nations,听听The onset of the war has only exacerbated these problems.听听This rapid increase in trade volume has helped Georgia鈥檚 economy rebound听after a period of steep economic decline during the Covid-19 pandemic.听While sanctions might deliver a modest blow to Russia, the ramifications could be devastating to Georgia.听

The Georgian government鈥檚 rhetoric stirred further controversy at the May 2023 Global Security Forum,听. Garibashvili was widely condemned by Georgia civil society organizations and the international community for echoing Kremlin propaganda, an accusation听. It鈥檚 possible the statement was not intended to be politically charged. After all,听. The discrepancy in Western responses in 2008 and 2022 remains a sore spot for Georgian leaders, who are vocal in their resentment of the 鈥榰nfair鈥� and 鈥榟ypocritical鈥� treatment of Georgia.听

Conclusion

As the EU鈥檚 final verdict on Georgia鈥檚 candidacy draws near, Georgian Dream leaders are scrambling to restore EU leaders鈥� confidence. Failure to obtain candidate status could jeopardize the Georgian Dream鈥檚 reelection chances in 2024, and their proclaimed strategy of appeasement towards the Kremlin has failed to discourage Russian provocation. In late August, Kremlin鈥檚 security council Deputy Chair Dmitry Medvedev threatened the听听of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and recently announced plans to establish a permanent naval base in the occupied region. Russian encroachment on Georgia鈥檚 territory may help Georgia rehabilitate its image, but integration still hinges on perceived Western support. NATO has taken steps in the right direction,听听for Georgia,听, and听. Meanwhile, the EU鈥檚 deadline to decide whether to grant Georgia candidate status is fast approaching, and EU leaders are faced with an arduous decision. Granting candidate status would require the EU to overlook Georgia鈥檚 severe democratic deficiencies, while failure to do so risks strengthening Russian influence in the Caucasus.听