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As some of Europe鈥檚 most conservative parties struggle to make inroads at the national level, their leaders are reorienting their gaze towards the European Parliament. Since June 2021, they have held meetings with increasing frequency, with the goal of establishing a parliamentary 鈥�.鈥� Theoretically, the group could grow to include as many as 145 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), tying the moderate Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) for the second largest in the Parliament. But questions remain about the feasibility of the group actually forming, and the group鈥檚 effectiveness if it does so.听听听

Falling Back to Parliament听

Some European far-right parties have shifted their focus to the EU to compensate for their loss of support on a national level. For example, Germany鈥檚 Alternativ f眉r Deutschland (AfD), who infamously outperformed their 2017 election poll numbers, lost eleven seats in Germany鈥檚 2021 elections, with a听.听Groups like AfD, who made headlines in the past but have now plateaued or even lost support on a national level, may feel compelled to听听with听likeminded parties in Europe. By cooperating, they could feasibly establish a large platform on the European level through which they could publicize their ideas and advance their agenda.听

Efforts in 2021 to Unite the European Right

Although Europe鈥檚 far right parties concern themselves primarily with their own national interests, leaders came together with shared grievances during two 鈥渟ummits鈥� that occurred in 2021. On July 3, sixteen signatories signed a document that outlined the group鈥檚 desire to fight for 鈥溾�澨齛ccording to Hungary鈥檚 Prime Minister Viktor Orb谩n. The group specifically condemned overreach from the EU, and demanded new ways for national courts to override or re-negotiate EU court decisions.听听

The December 4 meeting in Warsaw saw two key developments: more inflammatory language and an increased sense of urgency. First, in front of a monument dedicated to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, French politician Marine Le Pen directly accused the EU of blackmailing and threatening Poland, whose far-right Law and Justice party won a whopping听听during the May 2019 European Parliament elections. Second, the leaders promised to meet more frequently, hoping to consolidate faster in order to counterbalance an emerging German government under Chancellor Otto Scholz that will make 鈥溾��

The Madrid Summit: Reasons for Worry and Optimism听

At the end of January 2022, the group met again for a two-day summit in Madrid, organized by Spain鈥檚 Vox party. How this gathering unfolded might tell us a good deal about the future of this potential 鈥渟upergroup.鈥澨�

Reasons for Worry

The Madrid summit did have some successes. First, the meeting proved that far-right leaders can leverage their momentum to organize another meeting in only a month and a half, by far the shortest amount of time between summits. They also further underlined the broad areas where they are in agreement: fighting back against the 鈥溾�� that attacks the 鈥溾�澨齮he EU鈥檚 鈥溾�� and the need to defend 鈥溾�� In this way, they continued 鈥溾�� the proclaimed goal of the Madrid meeting according to Santiago Abascal, the leader of Spain鈥檚 Vox party.听

Reasons for Optimism听

But besides a show of unity centered around these vague, generalized statements, the concrete achievements were far less impressive. Once again, they failed to create an official group. The number of participants actually went down from the December Warsaw meeting, dropping from sixteen to fourteen. Finally, other key far-right leaders, like听, were absent again.听

The summit also showcased a good deal of infighting among those who did participate, especially concerning Russia. Poland鈥檚 Law and Justice (PiS) party and Spanish participants explicitly denounced Russia鈥檚 recent aggression in the Ukraine. But Le Pen and Orb谩n refrained from making similar statements, and Le Pen even outright听听that made any mention of Russia in a negative light.听

These debates demonstrate why a 鈥渇ar-right supergroup鈥� may be harder to establish in the European Parliament. Each participating party is fundamentally rooted in nationalism, and thus each leader has 鈥溾�� based on what most benefits their respective country. Orb谩n has refused to condemn Putin because of close economic and political ties. Le Pen has personal financial connections with Russia. These clash with the views of Mateusz Morawiecki, Poland鈥檚 far-right Prime Minister who feels threatened by Moscow鈥檚 aggression due to his country鈥檚 close proximity and difficult history with Russia.听Polish journalist Wojciech Przybylski called the 鈥溾�� both a 鈥減aradox鈥� and a 鈥淧R stunt,鈥� which can only work to boost support among Europeans on the conservative side of the political spectrum. Maybe he鈥檚 right.

Conclusion: A Real Threat or a Paper Tiger?听

Hypothetically, the threat of a far-right supergroup has not completely dissipated. It seems that they have many reasons to bind together, as opposition听from restrictive COVID measures and mass migration continues to generate more radical politics. However, even if they do succeed in creating a common declaration, one needs to ask how well they would function together in practice. Indeed, fundamental differences might fracture the coalition from day one. Different factions disagree about a variety of key issues. And oftentimes, 鈥溾�澨�

Sustained, constructive cooperation is unlikely and maybe even impossible. In the meantime, however, they do enjoy these 鈥溾�� gatherings that function as public shows of power in times of weakness. Maybe that is their real objective.