麻豆原创

US-EU relations over climate change mitigation have historically oscillated between cooperation and competition. The current听听听debate around the European Union鈥檚 proposal of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) represents the latest example of this dynamic. Although the CBAM has its flaws, the United States should embrace this EU initiative, as it will serve US interest and the global endeavor to effectively tackle climate change.听听

Introduction

The听听of efforts to push for global climate change mitigation. However, the Trump Administration seriously challenged this relationship, be it by withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accords and听. When President Biden assumed office, many EU representatives breathed a sigh of relief, perceiving a room of opportunity for renewed cooperation on climate change. However, while the Biden Administration does indeed aim to tackle climate change, this has not brought about a complete convergence of views between the transatlantic partners. The US鈥� current stance towards the CBAM exemplifies this.听

The CBAM

In July 2021, the European Commission proposed the CBAM as part of its Fit for 55 package, which aims to reduce, by 2030, the carbon emissions by 55% compared to 1990 levels, on the path to becoming the听. The CBAM would complement the EU-internal听, a cap-and-trade system enforced since 2005 in which its most carbon-intensive industries need to buy carbon allowances in exchange for emitting carbon. The CBAM is supposed to prevent 鈥渃arbon leakage鈥�: as the ETS places an increasing burden on European industries, putting them at a comparative disadvantage, the EU worries that either European firms might relocate to escape these regulations or more competitive, less carbon-efficient products might enter the single market. According to the Commission鈥檚 CBAM proposal, products can enter the European single market if non-EU听. By requiring foreign industries to pay for importing excessive emissions, the EU aims to re-establish a level-playing field for its domestic industries on the international market. The CBAM will initially听considered most vulnerable to carbon leakage: aluminum, steel, iron, electricity, fertilizers, and cement.听听

Competition and Cooperation听

The US鈥� response to the CBAM proposal has been lukewarm at best. Even before the official proposal by the European Commission, the听听at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2020, arguing that the CBAM violates WTO law and is akin to imposing trade barriers. During his visit to the European Commission before COP26 in March 2021, John Kerry, as the Presidential Climate Envoy, warned that the CBAM should only be a 鈥渓ast resort鈥� as it could听. This attempt to speak on behalf of other economies illustrates the US鈥� goal to regain leadership on climate change mitigation. Similarly, by questioning its legality, the US directly challenges the CBAM and communicates opposition to its implementation. The US鈥� reticence to the CBAM is somewhat bipartisan as shown by a听听addressed to Biden, urging him to dissuade the EU from implementing the CBAM.听

Notwithstanding, both sides continue to cooperate on the matter. The European Parliament鈥檚 (EP) rapporteur on the CBAM,听听between Members of the EP, US Congress, and the Biden Administration. According to him, increasing numbers of both Republicans and Democrats are in favor of a carbon border adjustment mechanism for the US, knowing that its less carbon-intensive industries can profit from it. If a carbon adjustment mechanism for the US were on the table, its reservations towards the EU鈥檚 CBAM would fade.听

Domestic Divides and Common Grounds

The idea of a carbon border adjustment mechanism has indeed gained support in US Congress. Recently, Democrats have proposed two different US carbon border adjustment mechanisms with the听听and the听, with the latter especially spurring听. However, the motivations of Republicans and Democrats for a US carbon border adjustment differ considerably. While Republicans envision a听听advancing the US鈥� geopolitical and economic interests, Democrats acknowledge that the mechanism would realistically require a domestic carbon pricing mechanism coupled with the proposed policy in order to be fair. Republicans have consistently opposed domestic carbon pricing, wary of the additional burden on domestic industries, while citing sufficiently stringent regulations already in place. Moreover, Democrats compromise on effective climate change mitigation in favor of more beneficial trade conditions: their proposed US carbon adjustment mechanism听, thereby incentivizing the exemption of US firms rather than more ambitious climate regulations. When also considering that US representatives frequently asked听, one can presume that the rationale of a large Congressional majority behind the US鈥� opposition to the CBAM is primarily to ensure a favorable American trade and business environment, with effective climate change mitigation as a secondary goal.听

Is the CBAM in US Interest?

Regarding the US鈥� business and trade interests, the CBAM would likely only have a limited impact on the US in the short term. Under the current proposal,听, a small portion of the听. US industries are more carbon-efficient than other foreign counterparts, meaning they would be charged less and would obtain greater access to the European single market. However, in the long term, the reach of the CBAM will likely be expanded, which would increase the burden on US industries.

That notwithstanding, the US should support the CBAM as an effective measure against climate change. Climate change threatens the US鈥� immediate short- and long-term interest. The听听declares with moderate certainty that if the global temperature increases to 1.5掳 Celsius, some of the US鈥� freshwater resources, its food and nutritional security, and its well-being, livelihoods, and economic activities would be at risk. Under current policies, the world would head up by听, so double the temperature increase under which the US would already be impacted.听

If the US wants to counteract this negative trend, its political landscape and strategy will have to change. Climate change mitigation has increasingly become a partisan issue which makes much needed cooperation on climate policies less likely to happen. In 2020, only听, compared to 88% of Democrats. Overall, the US has a history of favoring a听听approach, meaning utilizing investments and regulatory programs to govern emissions. This approach has arguably resulted in the US never meeting its climate pledges. As climate change threatens its very lifestyle and prosperity, the US depends on effective mitigation of climate change, both domestically and internationally.听

Conclusion: Advantages Outweigh Disadvantages听

Admittedly, the CBAM faces valid criticisms.听. Furthermore, the CBAM is believed to violate the Paris Agreement鈥檚 principle of 鈥淐ommon but Differentiated Responsibilities鈥� due to the听, as a result of their industries鈥� higher carbon intensity, their lack of advanced technologies, and听. Moreover, as the CBAM is supposed to subtract the monetization of the importers鈥� domestic regulations, in whatever form, ensuring all importers鈥� equal treatment will be challenging. But, as the CBAM still undergoes the EU legislative process, adjustments can still be made.听

Crucially, the听听in effectively reducing global carbon emissions. Likely to expand and mature over time, the CBAM could stimulate more ambitious policies around the globe, given importers鈥� preference to access the European single market. Specifically, the CBAM could serve the Biden Administration as a justification to consider similar policies domestically. The US should support the CBAM and the EU鈥檚 daring approach by keeping up the dialogue and learning from one another鈥檚 experiences, for the EU鈥檚 goal is to cut emissions which serves US interest. If the US truly wants to be a leader on climate change mitigation, it should do so by making achievements of its own, and not letting those of its competitor/cooperator fail.听